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ABSTRACT
Interest surrounding cryptocurrencies, digital or virtual currencies
that are used as a medium for financial transactions, has grown
tremendously in recent years. The anonymity surrounding these
currencies makes investors particularly susceptible to fraud—such
as “pump and dump” scams—where the goal is to artificially inflate
the perceived worth of a currency, luring victims into investing
before the scammers can sell their holdings. Because of the speed
and relative anonymity offered by social platforms such as Twitter
and Telegram, social media has become a preferred platform for
scammers who wish to spread false hype about the cryptocurrency
they are trying to pump. In this work we propose and evaluate
a computational approach that can automatically identify pump
and dump scams as they unfold by combining information across
social media platforms. We also develop a multi-modal approach
for predicting whether a particular pump attempt will succeed or
not. Finally, we analyze the prevalence of bots in cryptocurrency
related tweets, and observe a significant significant presence of bots
during the pump attempts.
KEYWORDS
cryptocurrency, pump and dump, social media data mining, anom-
aly detection
1 INTRODUCTION
The inception of blockchain technology [14] gave birth to the pop-
ular cryptocurrency Bitcoin (symbol BTC). Since then, thousands
of cryptocurrencies have emerged, and their hype has caused mas-
sive price swings on the trading markets. In December 2017, BTC
quadrupled in market value in just over a month, then within a few
days started a gradual decline until it reached half of its peak value.
These price changes allowed some investors to realize huge profits,
contributing to the allure of cryptocurrencies. Even though most
investments are made in relatively established cryptocurrencies,
including Bitcoin (BTC) and Ethereum (ETH), there are thousands of
other smaller cryptocurrencies. These currencies are prime targets
for manipulation by scammers, as evidenced by the proliferation of
pump and dump schemes.
Pump and dump schemes are those in which a security price
inflates due to deliberately deceptive activities. Those fraudulent
schemes originated in the early days of the stock market and are
now growing rapidly in the cryptocurrency market. The fact that
07
:00
09
:00
11
:00
13
:00
15
:00
17
:00
19
:00
21
:00
23
:00
Time
3.8
4.0
4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8
5.0
5.2
5.4
P
ric
e
CLOAK Pump Example on 2018-07-12
scammers
start sell here
Figure 1: Pump announcement by admin of a Telegram
Channel “Big Pump Signal,” overlayed on themarket values
of $CLOAK. The announcement precedes the price swing.
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CTFC) and U.S. Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have issued several warn-
ings [28] against cryptocurrency pump and dump schemes high-
lights the severity of the threat.
Although in the early days of cryptocurrencies, pump and dump
schemes were taking place by marketing teams in ICOs [26] (Initial
Coin Offerings), they are taking different forms nowadays. Pump
and dump schemes have three major components: (1) a group of
scammers; (2) a private or semi-private communication medium
where scammers coordinate their illicit activities; and (3) a social
media platform for conducting orchestrated campaigns to hype
a given coin. In a typical scenario, scammers create groups on
platforms such as Telegram or Reddit to coordinate group purchases
of a particular cryptocurrency, while creating false hype around
it by making public posts (i.e., pump) on social media platforms
such as Twitter. Normal traders, who only see the rise in the price
and are unaware of malicious activity, might buy the coin hoping
to anticipate the next trend, thus boosting the price even further.
Once a certain price target is met, the scammers start to sell (i.e.,
dump) their holdings, leading to a precipitous drop in the price. We
illustrate the process with an example mentioned in a Wall Street
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Journal article1 that we also found in our collected data. In this
example, the fraudsters coordinated their activities using a public
group “Big Pump Signal” on the Telegram messaging app, which
has more than 60, 000 members. As shown in Figure 1, after the
the coin CLOAK posted on the group at 7:00 PM GMT, the price
inflated immediately after the pump message and dropped shortly
afterwards.
As cryptocurrency trading attracts more public attention, it be-
comes extremely important to be able to detect such fraudulent
activities and inform potentially susceptible people before they
become victims of these crimes. Toward this end, we study the
extent to which pump and dump groups on online forums, such as
Telegram, are accompanied and correlated with suspicious activity
on Twitter and cryptocurrency price movements. In addition, we
quantify the ability of machine learning models to predict pump
and dump schemes from our data sources. In particular, we propose
and address the following two predictive tasks:
(1) Predict an unfolding pump operation/advertisement cam-
paign happening on Telegram.
(2) Predict whether a detected operation will succeed, i.e., will
the target price mentioned in the Telegram message be
reached by the market shortly after the announcement?
Although closely monitoring covert communication of fraud-
ulent users on Telegram enables us to detect pump and dump
schemes, in many realistic scenarios we might not have access
to such communication. For instance, some scammers are using
private channels with restricted access and membership fees, or
communicate on different platforms altogether. Furthermore, most
pump and dump events happen in a very short time after a coin
is announced on Telegram. Thus, we examine the possibility of
detecting pump and dump schemes without relying on availability
of the Telegram data. Remarkably, we demonstrate that it is indeed
possible to detect pump and dump events by leveraging only pub-
licly available information, such as Twitter and historical market
data.
Our main contributions are as follows:
(1) We propose a multi-modal approach to monitor potentially
malicious activities in cryptocurrency trading by combining
data from three distinct sources: (i .) Real-time market data
on crytpocurrency trading including both price and volume
information; (ii .) Twitter data of cashtag mentions for cryp-
tocurrencies; and (iii .) Telegram data that contains potential
mentions of and instructions for pump and dump activities.
(2) We identify pump and dump operations on Telegram mes-
sages by manually labeling a fraction of those messages as
“pump” versus “not-pump”, and then building a classifier to
label the remaining messages. Our approach is efficient for
dealing with huge numbers of unlabeled messages mention-
ing cryptocurrencies and achieves a high precision (Section
3).
(3) In Section 4, we explore the possibility of forecasting specific
pump and dump activities, as quantified on the two classi-
fication tasks, based on different combinations of features
1https://www.wsj.com/graphics/cryptocurrency-schemes-generate-big-coin/
Figure 2: The anatomy of a common pump announcement,
containing a “BUY” price and multiple target “SELL” prices.
“CP” and “Stop” refer to the current coin price and stop loss
respectively.
extracted from the above-listed data sources. Our results in-
dicate that it is indeed possible to forecast such events with
reasonable accuracy.
(4) We study the efficacy of pump and dump operations on
cryptocurrency price movements and Twitter activity in
Section 3.2 and investigate the prevalence of Twitter bots in
cryptocurrency-related tweets, especially during the alleged
pump and dump attacks, and observe that the majority of
highly active users are bots. (Section 5)
(5) We release2 a comprehensive dataset containing coins, time-
stamps, pump messages, and indications of whether or not
the pumps were successful—together with features we ex-
tract from Twitter.
2 DATA DESCRIPTION
In this section we describe the datasets used in our study, explain
the data collection process, and provide basic statistics of the data.
2.1 Telegram Data
In the context of the cryptocurrency market, scammers coordinate
within groups to inflate the market value for a coin using social
media platforms. In particular, the messaging platform Telegram is
widely used for sharing cryptocurrency-related information, includ-
ing pump announcements. The reason for Telegram’s popularity
among scammers is that it provides anonymity for the users. For
example, a Telegram channel consists of an anonymous admin and
a set of members; however, the only person who can post to the
channel is the admin who also is the only one who can see the list
of members, while his/her identity is anonymous to the members.
We implemented a crawler using the Telegram API3 to collect
data from Telegram channels. The crawling process starts with a set
of a few initial channel IDs, and thenwe extend the list by extracting
the other channels’ hyperlinks advertised in the seed channels and
add those channels to our set. We continue to snowball out as new
2Available at https://github.com/Mehrnoom/Cryptocurrency-Pump-Dump
3https://telethon.readthedocs.io/en/latest/
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channel IDs appear in the Telegram channels. Due to the nature of
how private channels are joined (the password to a private channel
can be passed via its URL), it is entirely possible that we would
crawl private channels if such URLs are posted in a public channel.
We make no distinction between the two classes in our experiment.
Table 1 shows the statistics of the Telegram data. We extracted
all the messages containing at least one coin from our coin list in-
cluding all the cryptocurrencies provided by CoinMarketCap.com,
which resulted in 195,576 messages. The Telegram channels in the
table are categorized by their size (number of members) because
channels with more members are more likely to contribute to a
pump event.
Table 1: Telegram data statistics. Top: Histogram of num-
ber of channels grouped by their size (i.e., members in each
channel). Middle: Summary statistics. Bottom: Number of
messages containing the coins in our coin list.
Channel Size(S) Count
S ∈ [0, 100] 51
S ∈ (100, 1000] 159
S ∈ (1000, 10000] 50
S ∈ (10000,∞) 63
Number of channels 423
Average channel size 6, 084
Median channel size 1, 005
Total number of messages 195, 576
2.2 Twitter Data
One way of promoting finance-related information on social media,
especially Twitter, is to use cashtags, which are ticker symbols of
stocks or cryptocorrencies prefixed by $, e.g., $BTC is the appro-
priate cashtag for Bitcoin. Using the Twitter streaming API,4 we
implemented a system that tracks all the cryptocurrencies provided
by CoinMarketCap.com, including 1,600 cashtags. We began the
data collection process on March 15, 2018. However, cryptocurren-
cies had received a considerable amount of attention prior, toward
the end of the 2017, due to growth in the Bitcoin price which paved
the path for fraudulent activities. For better coverage of the poten-
tially fraudulent events occurring before March 15, 2018, when we
began our data collection, we also purchased tweets from September
1, 2017, to March 31, 2018.
The resulting dataset includes 30,760,831 tweets and 3,708,176
users in total from September 1, 2017, to August 31, 2018. Figure
3 also shows the distributions of the number of users per cashtag.
The distribution is heavy-tailed, which suggests that many users
are interested in only a few cashtags, while a small number of users
tweet about many cashtags.
2.3 Cryptocurrency Market Data
This dataset consists of the time-series of market values for many
cryptocurrencies. We developed a crawler to collect data from
CoinMarketCap.com. Instead of using end-of-the-day historical
4https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/tweets/filter-realtime/overview.html
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Figure 3: Users’ degree distribution, showing most users are
interested in only a few cashtags, while some users discuss
a large number of cashtags.
data, we chose to use data with a five-minute granularity because
pump and dump schemes usually happen within a very short period.
The dataset includes all the coins listed on the website at the time
we started the collection process.
3 PUMP AND DUMP ACTIVITIES ON
TELEGRAM
As mentioned above, Telegram is a popular choice for scammers to
organize and coordinate pump and dump operations. To analyze
such activities, let us define the following two notions:
(1) Pump attempt: The act of targeting a coin on Telegram by
posting a pump message mentioning the coin as a “pump
attempt.” In Section 3.1 we describe our approach to detect
pump messages.
(2) Successful pump attempt: A pump attempt is successful
if the actual price approaches the target price within a time
window after the first pump message has been posted.
We next describe a simple method for detecting individual pump
attempts and assessing whether those attempts were successful.
The pump attempts (either successful or not) are used as ground
truth for building and evaluating predictive models proposed in
Section 4.
3.1 Pump Message Identification on Telegram
Most of the Telegrammessages in our dataset are about cryptocurrency-
related news, advice, and advertisements that are not relevant in
the context of predicting pump and dump activities. Only a small
fraction of those messages contain actual pump announcements. As
shown in Table 1, the number of cryptocurrency-related messages
is large, which would make it prohibitively expensive to manually
label them as pump-relevant or not. Fortunately, however, most of
the pump announcements follow specific patterns, or redundancies,
which we are able to detect with machine learning techniques.
Text is the most common format used by Telegram channels for
broadcasting pump events, although some channels embed the coin
name in an image to prevent trading bot activities (Figure 1). A
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Table 2: Telegram pump detection performance
Base Rate Accuracy Precision Recall F1
0.603 0.879 0.895 0.908 0.901
Table 3: Pump attempts statistics
Pump Attempts 62, 850
Pump Messages 47, 992
Channels 209
Coins 543
pump text message includes the name of the coin, the price to buy
the coin, and one or more desirable target prices to achieve.
We leverage this specific common pattern to extract pump-
related messages using a weakly supervised approach. Toward
this goal, we labeled 1,557 messages in total as pump/not-pump,
coming from 15 channels. To avoid bias toward a specific coin, we
replace all the cryptocurrency symbols based on whether they are
OOV (object out of vocabulary). We represent each post as a TF-IDF
vector. For a given post, an entry in its TF-IDF vector corresponds
to the frequency of a token appearing in the post (TF) divided by
the number of posts in which the token appeared (IDF). In general,
the size of the vector is equal to the size of the vocabulary of the
entire corpus. We can use word n-grams (a sequence of n words) to
construct the vocabulary.
We train a linear SVM with an SGD optimizer; this achieves an
accuracy of 87% and a precision of 89%. The optimal parameters
for linear classifier and TF-IDF tokenizer are obtained by cross-
validation. The best result is achieved when we use both unigrams
and bigrams, maxDF = 0.5,minDF = 0.01, and L2 penalty. The
classifier scores are included in Table 2. Using the trained model,
we then label the entire messages as pump/not-pump. From each
message, we extract the coins mentioned in the message and the
message timestamp. We call the (coin, timestamp) pair a pump
attempt. We aggregate multiple timestamps into the earliest one, if
they appear within a 3-hour window. We also remove the messages
that mention many coins, as a pump message usually targets only
a small number of coins. The statistics of the final set of messages
and pump attempts are given in Table 3.
3.2 Signatures of Pump and Dump Activities
on Market and Social Data
Having established the prevalence of pump and dump operations
on Telegram, we now analyze the effectiveness of those operations,
by juxtaposing pump messages with crytocurrency market data
and social signals collected from Twitter. Specifically, we focus
on the overall effect of pump attempts on cryptocurrency prices
and determine whether there is an indication of concurrent fraud
activity on Twitter.
Let Si = (ci , ti ) be a pump attempt, with ti the time of the at-
tempt, and ci the target coin (in the next section, we explain in
detail our approach for detecting pump attempts). For every pump
attempt Si = (ci , ti ) we extract two time series segments: The price
and tweet volume of coin ci , denoted as P˜ (ci )ti−w :ti+w and V˜
(ci )
ti−w :ti+w
respectively, wherew is a time window equal to three days. Each
segment is normalized between 0 and 1 by a minmax normaliza-
tion, transforming each point x to x˜ = (x −min)/(max−min). We
calculate Qpr ice and Qtwitter as follows:
Qpr ice =
1
n
n∑
i
P
(ci )
t and Q
twitter =
1
n
n∑
i
V
(ci )
t ,
Note that i ∈ [1,n] means that we have considered all the pump
attempts. For each coin, we also select a set of timestamps uniformly
at random, with the size equal to the number of pump attempts
targeting the coin. In the same manner, we make two aggregated
timeseries for the random timestamps.
Figure 4a depicts an average normalized price of each coin cen-
tered around the pump timestamps (Qpr ice ) and random times-
tamps. This figure shows a pattern of spikes occurring within one
hour of a pump message, followed by a general downward trend.
A significant increase in tweet volume is also observable in Figure
4b, which shows the average tweet volume of each coin around
the pump timestamps (Qtwitter ) and random timestamp. The sea-
sonality pattern present in the Telegram timestamps, and not in
the random timestamps, suggests that most of the pump attempts
happen around a specific time of day.
Successful PumpAttempts. Although Figure 4a indicates a price
spike for the aggregated data, it is reasonable to expect that not all
the pumpmessages are actually followed by a spike in the coin price.
Furthermore, even if there is a spike, it might fall short of meeting
the “target" price, thus resulting in failed pump. We used a simple
rule-based approach to extract the “buy" and “target" prices from
all the messages, and augmented this information with the coin
price data to decide whether a given pump attempt was successful
or not. Figure 5 shows the percentage of successful pump messages
for different thresholds and time windows. Fewer than 5% of the
pump messages meet the most strict conditions, meaning that the
coin price reaches a higher price than the extracted target price,
and within an hour of the pump message.
4 PUMP ATTEMPTS PREDICTION
In this section we study the feasibility of predicting pump and dump
events from the social media and market data only, without relying
on the availability of Telegram messages 5. Specifically, we focus
on the following two classification tasks:
• Task I: Detect whether there is an unfolding pump opera-
tion/advertisement campaign happening on Telegram, by
considering social signals only from Twitter, and historical
market data.
• Task II: Given a pump message on Telegram for a specific
coin, predict whether the operation will succeed (i.e., will
the target price, set by the scammers, be met within 6 hours
of the message is posted on Telegram).
Both of these tasks are cast as binary classification problems. The
feature vector for each record is extracted at a specific timestamp:
5We use Telegram messages only as ground truth for evaluating our predictive models,
but not as input to those models.
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Figure 4: Price (a) and Twitter (b) time series segments of cryptocurrencies separated by whether they are mentioned in a
Telegram pump and dump channel. Segments start 3 hours before and end 3 hours after the mention in a Telegram channel.
Timestamps are selected uniformly at random.
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Figure 5: Ratio of successful pumps for different thresholds
and timewindows. “100% threshold ” indicates the coin price
beats the extracted target price. “x% threshold” is when the
coin price either beats the price or reaches the x% of the ex-
tracted price.
specifically, it contains data from 6 hours prior to the timestamp.
The features of the timestamps are explained next.
4.1 Features
Table 4 explains all the features extracted from our data sources
that are used for the two prediction tasks. Graph features include:
(i.) PageRank score; (ii.) CorEx user embeddings; and (iii. ) user
connected components. These are extracted from the coin-coin
network, the pump-user network, and the user-user network, re-
spectively. These networks are undirected and temporal, where
the presence (or absence) of an edge depends on the time range in
which the networks are constructed. Each network is explained in
its corresponding feature section.
Economic Features. Include (i) Coin Market Cap, (ii) Volume, and
(iii) Price, in h ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,w} hours before timestamp t . For each
of these three, we also include percentage change. For example,
price percentage change at hour h is priceh+1−pricehpriceh .
Target Price Features. This feature will only be used in the sec-
ond classification task (whether the pump succeeds, introduced in
Section 4). As explained in Section 3, the definition of success de-
pends on the target price mentioned in a pumpmessage. For a given
pumpmessage with a mentioned target price x , we include x−pricehx
for h ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,w} hours before the pump message timestamp.
Twitter Statistics. For a given timestamp t , the features extracted
from time period [t , t −w] include (i.) the number of tweets men-
tioned the cashtag; (ii.) the number of unique users who mentioned
the cashtag in a tweet; and (iii.) the average sentiment of all the
tweets mentioning the cashtag calculated using [7].
PageRank Score. We calculate the PageRank score [16] of a coin
in the coin-coin graph created at time t , in which the nodes corre-
spond to the cashtags, connected by an edge if they are mentioned
by the same user, within the period [t - w, t]. The edge weights
correspond to the number of times two coins are co-mentioned by
a user.
CorEx User Embeddings. Consider a bipartite graph containing
pump attempts and users as nodes. The edge weight between a
pump attempt Si = (ci , ti ) and user uj is equal to the number of
times uj mentions ci in a tweet within the period [t −w, t]. Here
we chose w = 6 hours. We call this graph pump-user network
and denote B ∈ R |S |× |U | as the affiliation matrix of this bipartite
graph, where S and U are the set of pump attempts and users
respectively. Bij is equal to the weight of the edge connecting Si
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Table 4: Description of the features used in the pump predictions and user clustering.
Feature type Description
Twitter Features
• Number of tweets mentioned the cashtag in the period [t , t −w]
• Number of unique users mentioned the cashtag in the period [t , t −w]
• Average sentiment of all the tweets mentioning the cashtag in the period [t , t −w] calculated
using [7]
• PageRank score [16] of a coin in the Coin-Coin graph created at time t
• Twitter User Connected Components
• CorEx user embedding
Economic Features
• Coin market cap and market cap percentage change at h hour before the pump where h ∈
{1, 2, . . . , 12}
• Coin volume and volume percentage change at h hour before the pump where h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 12}
• Coin price and price percentage change in BTC unit at h hour before the pump where h ∈
{1, 2, . . . , 12}
• Target price percentage difference with coin price at h hour before the pump where h ∈
{1, 2, . . . , 12}
and uj . In fact, matrix B represents each pump attempt as a |U |-
dimensional vector of user activities, meaning that each user is
considered as a variable.Wewant to cluster users if their activity are
correlated. Total Correlation Explanation (CorEx) discovers a latent
representation of complex data based on optimizing an information-
theoretic approach. More specifically, given a set of n-dimensional
vectorsX ∈ Rm×n , CorEx aims to find latent variables Y = WX that
best describe the multivariate dependencies of X by minimizing
TC(X|Y) + TC(Y). Here, TC is “total correlation” or multivariate
mutual information [31].
We apply linear CorEx on B, and find the best number of latent
factors k by plotting the sum of the total correlation for each latent
variable against k . This value starts descreasing significantly when
k = 24. The weight matrix W ∈ Rm×k obtained from applying
linear CorEx is used as the embedding for the users. Later in Section
5 we further explore pump-user network and CorEx clusters for
analysing bot activities.
User Connected Components. We would like to characterize
groups of users that participate in coordinated spreading of “pump"
messages on Twitter. Given a coin c and all the pump instances
targeting c , Si = (c, ti ), a bipartite graph is built from the pump
instances and users. uj is connected to Si if uj tweeted about c
within the time period [ti − 6, ti ], measured in hours. From this
bipartite graph, we then build a user-user network, in which users
i and j are connected with a weighted edge that corresponds to the
time the users co-tweet about c . After this process, the graph is very
dense with usually > 80% of nodes belonging to one connected
component. We sparsify the graph by keeping the top-k edges per
user. Then we calculate the connected components from the graph,
dropping connected components consisting of less than 25 users.
Each user is now represented by the ID of its connected component.
Users that do not correspond to the connected components are
ignored in this feature representation. Manual inspection of the
connected components showed that they are indeed meaningful,
with the largest connected component usually corresponding to
users who are likely involved in pump and dump operations. Given
a coin and a timestamp, we create a feature vector containing the
counts of users tweeting about the coin, grouped by the connected
components they belong to. Intuitively, these features represent
how active a group (connected component) has beenwithin a period
from t −w to t . We tried k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and the final result does not
change much. However, higher values produced just a handful of
sizable connected components.
4.2 Classification Tasks
In this section we explain the experimental setting and prediction
tasks design.
Task I: Predicting Pump Attempts. We propose a binary clas-
sification task for predicting Telegram pump messages that will
happen in the future, from Twitter activity. In our setup, we use
the timestamps of Telegram messages labeled as pump attempts
by our classifier as positives. We use an equal number of random
timestamps as negatives.
Task II: Will the Pump Succeed? The positives of this task are
a subset of the positives in Task I—namely, the pumps that have
succeeded. In other words, the target price mentioned in the pump
message was successfully met by the market. The negatives of this
task include all the negatives of Task I and some of the positives of
Task 1—specifically, the pump messages that were not successful.
In other words, the target price was not reached within 6 hours of
the pump message.
For both tasks, we train a binary Random Forest classifier. It
might be possible to improve the classification accuracy by using
sophisticated approaches, i.e., neural nets, but since our focus is
to demonstrate the possibility of classification, we focus on tradi-
tional methods. We split the dataset into train/test, such that each
sample (c, t) corresponding to coin c at time t is in the training set
if t < d and in the test set otherwise. For each coin, d is picked
in way to reach a 75%/25% split. Let Train = {S1, S2, ..., Sd } and
Test = {Sd+1, Sk+2, ...Sn }, sorted by their timestamps. For each
coin, we train a separate classifier in the following way:
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Figure 6: AUC-ROC score of the model, varying the time pe-
riod of consideration from 1 to 24 hours.
Algorithm 1
Input:
1: Coin c
2: Train = {Si |Si = (c, ti )}di=1 , sorted by ti
3: Test = {Si |Si = (c, ti )}ni=d+1 , sorted by ti
for Si in Test do
model = RandomForestClassi f ier .train(Train)
Pi =model .in f erence(Si )
Add Si to Train
Remove Si from Test
Add Pi to Prob
return Prob
We evaluate the approach using the Area Under the Receiver
Operating Characteristic Curve (ROC-AUC), which gives a baseline
of 0.5 for random guesses; the higher the metric, the better. The
features are chosen as explained in Section 4.1. Figure 6 shows
AUC-ROC score by time period in the past. Based on this plot, for
the first task, we choosew = 15 for economic and Twitter features.
For the second task, we choose w = 15 for Twitter features and
w = 7 for economic features.
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Figure 7: Average ROC plot for the two classification Tasks
that we consider. All features are used for the classification.
4.3 Results and Discussion
Table 5a summarizes Task I results. The columns describe the pre-
diction accuracy measured in AUC score when using Twitter-only,
economic-only, and combined features. When using a combination
of features, the AUC score averaged over all the coins is 0.74, which
is significantly better than random baseline. We can see that social
media features are more effective for this task, although adding
economic features provides a slight increase. Finally, when we take
the average over only the top 20 highest volume coins, the predic-
tion accuracy increases slightly. In the table we also show the AUC
numbers for the five coins with the highest AUC score when using
all the features.
The results for Task II are shown in Table 5b. Overall, we see
that the average accuracy is lower for this task compared to Task
I, but is still considerably better compared to a random baseline.
We also note that compared to Task I, the variance in the AUC
scores is considerably higher. Interestingly, we observe that in
average, economic features are much more useful for this task
(average AUC of 0.7) than Twitter features (average AUC of 0.59).
Furthermore, adding Twitter features to the economic features
actually deteriorates performance. The average ROC curve when
using all features is plotted in Figure 7 for both classification tasks.
We suggest that the Twitter features are more predictive for
the first task, due to the social nature of this process. To be more
specific, when scammers target a coin (pump attempt), they try to
promote it in different social media platforms, resulting in correlated
activity on Telegram and Twitter. However, as we observed in
Section 3.2, only a small ratio of pump attempts “succeed” based
on our definition. Therefore, although a pump operation might
generate extra traffic in Twitter, its effect on the coin price depends
on many other factors such as market characteristics. This might
be the reason that for the second task, using only market/economic
features gives us better performance. One possible explanation for
performance drop when we add Twitter features in the second
task is that the number of positive labels for this task is very low,
and adding Twitter features increases the sparsity. Although we
removed the coins with less than five positive in their training set,
the number of positives is 14 in average for the remaining coins
(less than 15% ratio in average, and for some coins as low as 6%). The
average dimension of the Twitter features is 52 (it could vary across
the coins, because of the number of the connected components)
and more than a hundred for some coins.
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Table 5: ROC-AUC test performance on the two binary tasks,
averaging 10 different train:test partitions. We show evalu-
ations for three feature-sets. From right to left: The right-
most is “Both,” utilizing bothfinancial andTwitter. The “Eco-
nomic” and “Twitter” utilize economic and Twitter features
separately. The average AUC score is reported for (i) all the
coins (ii) 20 coins with the highest dollar volume. The top
five most-predictable coins are also shown for each task.
(a) Classification Task I: Predicting Pump Attempts
Twitter Economic Both
Average AUC (all coins) 0.73 ± 0.07 0.67 ± 0.1 0.74 ± 0.08
Average AUC (top 20 vol.) 0.75 ± 0.06 0.68 ± 0.1 0.75 ± 0.07
$ADA 0.85 0.84 0.88
$NCASH 0.84 0.81 0.88
$DGB 0.79 0.76 0.86
$RCN 0.82 0.61 0.85
$TRX 0.83 0.81 0.84
(b) Classification Task II: Will the Pump Succeed?
Twitter Economic Both
Average AUC (all coins) 0.59 ± 0.16 0.70 ± 0.19 0.66 ± 0.17
Average AUC (top 20 vol.) 0.62 ± 0.18 0.76 ± 0.17 0.71 ± 0.16
$NMR 0.71 0.36 0.94
$XEM 0.63 0.66 0.90
$XRP 0.77 0.84 0.90
$QTUM 0.83 0.80 0.89
$ARK 0.47 0.77 0.88
We investigated the reasons for obtaining high accuracy scores
for some coins but not the others. In particular, we analyzed poten-
tial relations between the prediction accuracy and financial indi-
cators of a coin such as market cap, volume, and so on. As shown
in Table 5b, the accuracy score is typically higher for coins with
higher dollar volume. Our preliminary analysis of other features
produced rather ambiguous results, as we did not find meaningful
correlations between accuracy and coin features. This may require
more thorough investigation in the future.
5 PREVALENCE OF TWITTER BOTS
In this section, we study the presence of bot activity around pump
attempts by exploring the pump-user network that we explained in
Section 4.1. This bipartite network has 36 connected components,
but the largest connected component contains roughly 99% of the
users and 99% of pump attempts. Below we discuss the involvement
of Twitter bots in those attempts.
First, from our tweet dataset we extract the tweets containing
a Telegram invitation link (e.g., http://t.me/Monsterpumper). We
label the users associated with these tweets as telegram active
users.
Next, we use two approaches for classifying a user as a bot.
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Figure 8: Score distribution obtained using Botometer API.
Shows the probability of a user being bot.
• Twitter Suspended List. Using the Twitter API, we collected
the most recent account status of the users in our dataset
and checked whether they are still active or suspended by
Twitter.
• Botometer Score [29]. Twitter works based on algorithms
with high precision but low recall, since they do not want to
mistakenly suspend users that are not bots. So we employed
the Botometer API 6 to detect other potential bots. Given a
user id, Botometer returns a probability of that user being
a bot. Botometer classifies users using six types of features:
friend, network, content, sentiment, temporal, and user. Fig-
ure 8 shows the distribution of the classifier score using all
six features.
A user was classified as a bot if either the user was suspended or
its Botometer score is above 0.55 7.
Table 6 shows an increasing ratio by degree. For a given user, the
degree is the sum of the weights of its adjacent edges in the pump-
user network and is the number of times the user participated in
the pump operations. This suggests that a larger fraction of highly
active users are bots, and the ratio increases with the activity level.
For example, 84% of the users that participated more than 10K times
in the pump activities are either suspended or are bots, according
to their Botometer score.
User Clustering. Now we look at different user clusters. Using
the weight matrixW obtained from applying CorEx on B (explained
in more detail in Section 4.1) we cluster the users of the pump-user
network by assigning user ui to arдmaxWi .
Figure 9 shows the ratio of the bots and Telegram-active users in
each cluster. The blue bar shows the ratio of the users that are bots
and Telegram-active. Note that the bot ratio is the number of users
that are either suspended or have a botometer score > 0.55. The first
and second cluster have 734 and 1,011 members respectively where
6https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu/#!/api
7We use 0.55 instead of 0.5 suggested by [29] to avoid edge cases
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Table 6: Ratio of scammer users based on the number of
times a user contributes to the pump attempts. The ratio of
Telegram active users and suspended users is higher among
highly active users.
Degree
Total
# Users Suspended
Telegram
Active
Botometer
Score > 0.55
50 20881 0.19 0.27 0.20
100 10969 0.23 0.34 0.20
500 2577 0.40 0.37 0.24
1000 1435 0.46 0.36 0.24
5000 340 0.56 0.30 0.25
10000 179 0.42 0.29 0.36
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Figure 9: Ratio of bots and Telegram-active users in each
cluster
more than 80% of them are bots. Cluster 16 is also interesting in
a sense that it has 600 members where 50% of them are Telegram-
active, and around 60% are bots. Cluster 17 and 18 have 3K members
each with a low ratio of bot members.
6 RELATEDWORK
We split the discussion of the related work into three complemen-
tary threads. First, we focus on fraud in social media and some of
the efforts that have been taken to address it. Next, we discuss other
work that analyzes the relation between financial market and social
media data. We then describe the effort on studying cryptocurrency
activity, with a special focus on work that includes social media in
its analysis.
Social media has a long history of fraudulent activity, and some
types of fraud appear in our work. First, when scammers attempt to
pump a coin by making it look more popular than it actually is, they
are engaging in a specific type of misinformation. Misinformation
is a major problem on social media [32], and several recent efforts
have tried to detect it [11, 19, 24]. Another burgeoning line of work
is bot detection [25]. There is a known connection between bots
and misinformation, wherein bots are actively employed to spread
misinformation in social networks [5, 12]. We leverage previous
literature in these areas in our approach. The bot labeling approach
that we use in the bot assessment portion is based on previous
work [8]. Additionally, we study the dynamics of users’ reactions to
the pump and dump campaigns. This is similar to previous work on
social media where similar inputs are used to identify susceptible
users [15, 22].
The literature on predicting various financial market properties
exploiting signals from different social media data is quite extensive.
[1, 2, 30] use sentiment features to predict stock price movements,
while [21, 23, 27] employ network features extracted from various
social media interactions. However, only a few papers study stock
market manipulations on social media. [20] studies pump and dump
in OTC (Over The Counter or Penny stocks) and shows that an
abnormally high number of messages on Twitter is associated with
price increase followed by a price reversal. [3] shows the presence
of bot and spam activity on Twitter stock microblogs and compares
Twitter activity with financial data. Authors in [4] uncover and
introduce Cashtag Piggybacking, a type of malicious activity on
Twitter in which scammers try to highlight low-value stocks by
co-mentioning them in the tweets with high-value stocks.
Several papers study cryptocurrencies, and analysts build models
to predict their price movement. An example is [9]. In this paper
the authors use cryptocurrency forums to predict the price and vol-
ume of cryptocurrencies. In another effort [17] the authors build a
model to predict price fluctuations of cryptocurrencies. Specifically,
they use epidemic models on social media activity to predict price
bubbles of cryptocurrencies. [10] further tests how users discuss
cryptocurrencies and how that discussion impacts price. They found
that specific topics are likely to be tied to price movements. [18]
extends this analysis by using wavelets to predict price movements
based on social media data. [6] looks into the dynamics underlying
social media and how they correlate with cryptocurrency price.
They find that opinion polarization has a significant effect on price,
and use this to build a model that predicts the price of the cryptocur-
rency. In an effort to understand the dynamics of cryptocurrency
discussions, [13] performed topic modeling on a popular cryptocur-
rency discussion forum. They identified several common threads
of discussion, such as bitcoin theft. Moreover, they showed that
different mining technologies have different patterns of adoption on
the forums. Our work stands apart from these methods by moving
away from predicting price and volume movements, and instead
identifying patterns of malicious behavior.
The work that is most related to ours is [33], where the main
goal is predicting which coin will be pumped based on social signals
from Telegram. The authors focus on “pre-pump” messages that
announce an upcoming pump operation, but do not mention a coin.
They developed a model to predict the likelihood of each coin being
the target of the subsequent pump operation following the “pre-
pump” message. Our work is complementary in that we consider a
richer set of prediction problems, we use social signals from Twitter,
and we provide a user-centric analysis of such pump attacks.
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7 CONCLUSION
In this paper we present a novel computational approach for iden-
tifying and characterizing cryptocurrency pump and dump opera-
tions that are carried out in social media. Specifically, given finan-
cial and Twitter data pertaining to a particular coin, our method
is able to detect, with reasonable accuracy, whether there is an
unfolding attack on that coin on Telegram, and whether or not the
resulting pump operation will succeed in terms of meeting the an-
ticipated price targets. We also analyze activities of users involved
in pump operations, and observe a prevalence of Twitter bots in
cryptocurrency-related tweets in close proximity to the attack.
In future work, we plan to augment our datasets with other
sources (e.g., Reddit posts) to help with the prediction tasks con-
sidered here. Also, while our analysis of bot activity relied on sus-
pended accounts, it will be interesting to develop a bot detection
tailored to the cryptocurency domain. Finally, as a practical outcome
of the work presented here, we envision building a cryptocurrency
monitoring system that will detect impending pump attacks in
real-time and warn susceptible users.
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